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this opportunity to be a part of it. As some of you may know, I was the
secondchoiceforthisslot,butthatdoesn’tbothermeatallbecausethe
ﬁrstchoicewasDonBrash,theGovernoroftheReserveBankofNewZealand
and a pathbreaker in bringing both transparency and accountability to central
banking in practice. I won’t be able to ﬁll Don’s shoes completely, but I have
a strong interest in this topic, and I am very happy that Bill and Dan saw ﬁt to
give me the opportunity to share some thoughts with this distinguished group.
Actually, it is hard to imagine that anyone interested in improving the
conduct of monetary policy would not be interested in this topic. There is a
growing consensus among monetary economists at this point that the impact
of monetary policy on expenditure is transmitted primarily through the effects
of policy actions on expectations regarding the future path of short-term in-
terest rates rather than the current level of the overnight rate.1 Further, the
more ﬁnancial markets know about the reasons for a central bank’s current
policy actions and its longer-run policy intentions, the more likely it is that
market reactions to policy actions will reinforce these actions and increase
the effectiveness of stabilization policy. It follows that central banks should
be highly transparent regarding both their long-term policy objectives and the
shorter-term tactical actions they take with policy instruments.
Against this background, it seems to me that the Fed, along with other
central banks, has made considerable progress in increasing transparency in
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recent years. When I ﬁrst joined the Fed back in 1970, to the extent that
anyone thought explicitly about transparency issues at all, the idea seemed
to be that limited transparency—or even no transparency—was best. Central
banks in industrial democracies were thought to work most effectively behind
the scenes, away from the glare of public scrutiny, at least in part because they
couldthenquietlytakeappropriateactionsthatmightbepoliticallyunpopular,
or,morebroadly,difﬁculttoexplaintoapublicnotwellversedintheintricacies
of ﬁnance.2 There was also a belief in some quarters that central banks could
enhance the effects of certain policy actions—most notably foreign exchange
market intervention operations—if they kept market participants uncertain
about their intentions.
Attitudes toward transparency appeared to change in the 1980s, partly re-
ﬂecting progress made by economists in understanding the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, and probably partly because of public demand, par-
ticularly in the United States, for greater openness in government and public
policy generally. (As you may recall, the most widely read popular book
about the Fed and Fed policy in the 1980s was somewhat derisively titled
Secrets of the Temple.) Further, in the early 1980s, Chairman Volcker pub-
licly took responsibility for reducing inﬂation from its then high level, and
subsequently took strong and temporarily painful actions to accomplish the
reduction. Some public explanation of the need for these steps was required,
and this need probably facilitated the transition to viewing transparency more
favorably. In any case, given the normal resistance to change in bureaucratic
organizations, I believe the Fed has made remarkable progress over the last
decadeorsoinopeningupitsconductofmonetarypolicytomarketandpublic
scrutiny.
Since the Fed is now quite open regarding many important aspects of its
policy strategy and operations, and in view of the strong performance of the
U.S. economy in recent years, at least up until the last several quarters, one
might reasonably ask whether still greater transparency is necessary or even
desirable in U.S. monetary policy. I think it is, and I will try to make this
case in the next few minutes. Let me comment brieﬂy on four points: (1) the
transparency of our long-term inﬂation objective, (2) what I’m going to refer
to as the “intermediate-term transparency problem,” (3) the transparency of
ourpolicydirective,includingits“tilt,”and(4)theroleoftestimony,speeches,
and other public statements by Fed ofﬁcials in providing transparency.
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1. TRANSPARENCY OF THE LONG-TERM INFLATION
OBJECTIVE
Probably the most important thing the public wishes to know and needs to
know with some precision about Fed monetary policy is our long-term ob-
jective for inﬂation. Longer-term inﬂation expectations are obviously critical
to households and businesses in committing to long-term investments, home
purchases,insurancecontracts,andwageandbeneﬁtagreements. Conversely,
the Fed needs the public to understand and trust its long-term commitment to
low inﬂation to achieve maximum beneﬁt from this long-term strategy.
How to convey this objective credibly to the markets and the public has
been a major focus of our policy research at the Richmond Fed for a long
time. FormanyyearsI’vepersonallybeenconvincedthatcontrollinginﬂation
should be the Fed’s overriding objective, that this objective should be explicit,
and that it should be supported by a congressional mandate. At one level,
abstracting, for example, from political obstacles, this seems obvious. We
know that the Fed has the ability to determine the long-run inﬂation rate with
monetary policy, and theoretical analysis and all of our practical experience
suggest we should use that power in the public interest to maintain low and
stable inﬂation over time.
An explicit long-term inﬂation objective supported by a congressional
mandate would be a substantially beneﬁcial step, in my view, even if it were
limited to a verbal statement along the lines of the language in the proposed
Neal Amendment to the Federal Reserve Act.3 Quantifying the objective in
terms of an explicit numerical rate (say, 2 percent per annum using the core
PCE inﬂation index) would make the objective even more transparent and
probably more effective.
Committing to an explicit inﬂation objective would achieve at least three
things. First, it would help anchor longer-term inﬂation expectations and
therefore facilitate the longer-term transactions I noted earlier. Second, it




Third, and most importantly, an explicit inﬂation objective would disci-
pline the Fed to explain and justify short-run actions designed to stabilize out-
put and employment against our commitment to protect the purchasing power
of the currency over the long run. An explicit objective would force such
explanations and justiﬁcations to be more sharply focused than in the current
regime without such an objective. Routine, clear explanations of short-term
actions would build conﬁdence in the Fed’s commitment to price stability and
3 See Black (1990) and Greenspan (1990).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
over time help reinforce credibility for low inﬂation. If the explanations were
made in testimony before Congress, supplemented perhaps by a written inﬂa-
tion report along the lines of the Bank of England model, Congress would be




now largely embodied in our current Chairman’s demonstrated commitment
to this objective, rather than being institutionally grounded in an explicit ob-
jective. It is therefore inherently tenuous since its continuance will depend on
thepreferencesoffutureChairmenandtheirsusceptibilitytopoliticalpressure
to pursue other goals.
For all these reasons, it seems clear to me that the increased transparency
that would be provided by an explicit long-term inﬂation objective would
increase the probability that we will attain our goal over time. Some argue
strongly for a dual objective that refers explicitly to output or employment as
well as inﬂation. But both theory and experience indicate that the Fed cannot
control real variables directly with monetary policy, and in my view there are
reasonablegroundstopresumethattheFedwilloptimizeitscontributiontothe
economy’s overall performance by maintaining credibility for low inﬂation.4
Aunitarygoalfocusedonlowinﬂationwouldstrengthencredibilitybymaking
the Fed’s commitment to this objective deﬁnite and unambiguous.
It is one thing to advocate an explicit inﬂation objective; it is another to
actually put one in place. I doubt seriously that an explicit objective set and
announced unilaterally by the Fed would be credible. Any explicit inﬂation
objective would need to be accepted by the government as a whole through
legislationorsomeotherformalagreement, assuchobjectivesareincountries
thatemploythem. Withitspublicstandinghigh,theFedseemswellpositioned
currently to make the case for such a mandate.
2. INTERMEDIATE-TERM ISSUES
Even if the Fed obtains a price stability mandate, transparency issues are
still likely to arise in practice—speciﬁcally, when current inﬂation or near-
term inﬂation projections deviate from the long-term objective. For example,
inﬂation may rise above its objective at a time when real output is below
potential and unemployment is rising. It would be difﬁcult or impossible in
this situation for the Fed to ignore the weakness in the real economy and act
aggressively to bring inﬂation quickly back to target.
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Somehavearguedthatpreciselythispossibilitymakesanexplicitinﬂation
objective for the United States impractical. I don’t ﬁnd this objection particu-
larly compelling. Especially if the Fed has previously established credibility,
inﬂation may remain above its objective for some time without undue damage
to the Fed’s credibility if the Fed is transparent regarding its medium-term
strategy for bringing inﬂation back to path. Even with established credibil-
ity, explaining this strategy clearly and convincingly to market participants
and the general public would be challenging. Strategies and the accompany-
ing explanations will have to be tailored to each case. In particular, the Fed
may anticipate bringing inﬂation back to the objective more quickly in some
cases than in others. Consequently, it may be useful for the Fed to announce
intermediate-term inﬂation forecasts to assist the public in making ﬁnancial
and business decisions during the transition back to the long-term objective.
Beyond this, even if inﬂation is stable at or near its long-term objective,
unanticipated shocks may push employment and output growth temporarily
awayfromtheirsustainablenoninﬂationaryrates. Here,too,Fedtransparency
about its intentions will help the public gauge how production, employment,
andinterestrateswillevolveinthemediumtermastheeconomyadjuststothe
shock. TransparencyisintheFed’sinterestaswellsinceitcanhelpbuildcon-
ﬁdence that, ﬁrst, monetary policy can be effective in dealing with temporary
departures of real activity from its long-term potential, and, second, that the
Fed has the competence to exploit this capability. More generally, I believe
thattheFed’sexpertiseregardingthefunctioningoftheU.S.economy—while
farfromperfect—isnowofhighenoughqualitythattransparencyofourthink-
ing about the economy’s medium-term prospects can build public conﬁdence
and trust in periods of economic stress. To be sure, actual developments may
deviate from our announced expectations in particular situations, but trust can
be maintained if the Fed provides reasonable explanations for the deviations.
3. TRANSPARENCY OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
TARGETAND THE DIRECTIVE “TILT”
Having dealt with longer-term and intermediate-term issues, let me now make
a few comments about transparency as it relates to short-term policy tactics:
speciﬁcally, transparency regarding the current Federal funds rate target, the
“tilt” of the directive language, and the statement released to the press after
each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. It is in this area that
the greatest progress has been made in increasing transparency over the last
decade. The funds rate target set at a particular FOMC meeting, previously
released only after the next FOMC meeting, since February 1994 has been6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
announcedshortlyafteradjournmentofthemeetingwhereitisset. So,markets
now know the current target. And the Committee has released the tilt (or
absence of a tilt) in the directive language along with the current funds rate
target since its meeting on May 18, 1999. Previously, it too had been released
only after the next FOMC meeting.
This increased instrument transparency, in my view, is all to the good. I
believe the immediate release of the tilt language is especially useful. Again,
the effect of monetary policy is transmitted to the economy not only through
the current level of the funds rate target but also through market expectations
about the future level of the target, which are reﬂected in the short-term yield
curve. Market participants are going to form these expectations in any event.
Byannouncingthetiltimmediately,theFOMCsharesitsbestcurrentestimate
of the most likely direction of any near-term change in the funds rate target,
which should increase the efﬁciency with which markets form their expecta-
tions,helppreparemarketsandthepublicforchangesinthetarget,andreduce
short-term disruptions caused by leaks. In particular, since markets know the
current tilt, they are better positioned to interpret the likely policy implica-
tions of incoming current economic data. For example, the release of strong
data after disclosure of an upside tilt in the directive language should increase
the probability that long-term rates will be bid upward in response. Conse-
quently, immediate disclosure of the tilt should enable long-term interest rate
adjustments to perform their stabilizing role in the economy more effectively.
While,again,considerableprogresshasbeenmadeinincreasingthetrans-
parency of the Fed’s short-term instrument settings, and its short-term expec-
tations regarding at least the direction of future settings, there is room for
further progress in my view. In particular, there may be different views about
the extent to which a tilt in the directive in one direction or the other commits
or obliges the Fed to a future funds rate change. To the degree that markets
interpret a tilt as committing the Fed to future action, failure to take action
may surprise or “whipsaw” markets. It should be possible for the Fed to mit-
igate this problem by emphasizing publicly that a tilt only implies a greater
likelihood that any near-term change in the funds rate will be in a particular
direction and is not a commitment to any action. It might seem tempting to
consider eliminating the tilt in the formulation of short-term policy to remove
anyconfusionitmayproduce. Butsuchareductionintransparencywouldde-
prive the FOMC of the beneﬁts of announcing the tilt noted above. Moreover,
beyond these beneﬁts, abandoning it would deprive the Committee of a use-
ful way to keep in touch with the strength of its internal consensus regarding
policy at any point in time and of a valuable supplementary tool for reaching
agreementonafundsratetargetwhenthereisasigniﬁcantdivergenceofviews
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Finally,itisimportanttorecognizethatthelanguageofthepressstatement
announcingthefundsratetargetandanytiltaftereachmeetingalsoinﬂuences
market expectations regarding future policy actions. This language is widely
reported and interpreted currently in media coverage of FOMC meetings. In
essence, the language in the statement, like the tilt language in the directive, is
viewed by market participants as an additional short-term policy instrument.
4. TESTIMONYAND SPEECHES
The role of the Fed’s explicit policy announcements in shaping market ex-
pectations of future policy actions is obviously important, but as anyone even
slightly interested in Fed policy is well aware, public statements by individual
FOMC members (including Reserve Bank presidents who are not currently
voting Committee members) are at times especially important. This is par-
ticularly so in today’s environment where media coverage of these utterances
by cable television ﬁnancial news channels, instant e-mail transmission of
market analysis, and the like are much more extensive than even just a few
yearsago. Obviously,theFedChairman’sremarksincongressionaltestimony
(including answers to questions as well as prepared testimony), his speeches,
and his interviews are followed more intensely than the comments of other
FOMC participants since the Chairman is clearly the most inﬂuential Com-
mittee member and only he speaks for the Committee as a whole. At times,
however, comments of other participants can affect market expectations, at
least in the short run, if, for example, a comment is the Fed’s ﬁrst public re-
action to a new economic report (particularly if the content of the report was
unanticipated by markets), or the comment comes at a time when markets
are especially uncertain about near-term policy prospects. Consequently, we
also receive our share of media attention. Bill Poole, I, and, I expect, all of
our colleagues at other Reserve Banks can tell stories about being covered
by several reporters even when making speeches in fairly remote parts of our
respective districts.
Some argue that this form of Fed transparency may be counterproductive,
atleastattimes,iftheviewsexpressedinthesecommentsseeminconsistent—
particularly if they appear to conﬂict with a recent FOMC decision or a public
statement by the Chairman. On occasion I have personally received criticism
and complaints from market professionals and others when they have found
my statements at variance with other Fed statements or confusing in some
other way, and I will acknowledge that on a few occasions my remarks may
have brieﬂy complicated the formation of market expectations.
Over time, however, speeches and other public statements by individual
FOMC participants provide markets and the public with a more robust and
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and ﬁnancial conditions and near-term prospects than that provided by the
policy announcements I discussed a minute ago alone. Also, it is important to
recognize that market analysts are adept at ﬁltering and appropriately weight-
ing press reports of individual FOMC participant remarks in the context of
the broad range of Fed public statements from all sources. In short, I believe
a convincing case can be made that the public remarks of individual Reserve
Bank presidents and other FOMC participants increase the efﬁciency with
which markets form short-term policy expectations.
I would offer one other—admittedly speculative—note on this point. It is
obvious, again, that the Fed Chairman speaks with by far the most inﬂuential
voiceamongFOMCparticipants. Itmightappearsuperﬁciallythatcomments
by other participants that seem to be “off message” might create confusion
about the Fed’s intentions and undermine the force of the Chairman’s state-
ments. AsIjustsuggested,theremightbealittleofthisfromtimetotime,butI
doubttheseinstancesareofmuchsigniﬁcance. Again, marketsarewellaware
of the much greater weight of the Chairman’s statements and discount the re-
marks of other FOMC participants accordingly. Perhaps more importantly,
public commentary by other participants reinforces the Chairman’s credibil-
ity in the eyes of informed observers of Fed policy since it demonstrates that
the Chairman leads, builds consensus among, and speaks for a thoughtful,
competent group of policy professionals who naturally have diverse views on
speciﬁc policy choices. If the public believed the Chairman was conducting
policy unilaterally, he or she would be more vulnerable to an abrupt loss of
public conﬁdence. This might not be a risk for the current Chairman, who
justiﬁably enjoys exceptionally high public respect, but it could be a problem
for a future Chairman.
5. CONCLUSION
Again, I have enjoyed participating in this panel discussion. This conference
has addressed what is clearly a crucial topic in understanding how monetary
policy affects the economy and how it might be improved. The subject de-
serves continued research. Thanks to this conference, I am conﬁdent it will
get it.J.Alfred Broaddus, Jr.: Transparency and Monetary Policy 9
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